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Executive summary
The Direct Long-term Trade Impacts of EU Exit Scenarios on Northern 
Ireland 
 ■ This report focusses on the long-term economic impact of Brexit, as well as the potential 
implications of the UK Government’s Withdrawal Agreement, and specifically the so called 
“Backstop” on Northern Ireland’s economy. The analysis is undertaken using a multi-
sectoral dynamic macroeconomic model of Northern Ireland (NI). The model captures the 
domestic economy and key trade relationships between NI, the rest of the UK and the rest 
of the World (including the EU), and allows the analysis of a range of scenarios relative to a 
counterfactual position. 
 ■ We find that, based upon the assumptions and methodologies set out in this report, 
all Brexit options will negatively impact the NI economy with simulated reductions in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranging from 3.3% (hard Brexit) to 1.1% (soft Brexit). The 
scenarios examined that involve NI trade taking place within the context of the “Backstop” 
demonstrate simulated reductions in GDP ranging from 2.7% to 1.3%.
 ■ These impacts are significantly smaller than those presented by the UK Government as part 
of its long term analysis published in November 2018. This research indicated that under a 
“no deal” scenario, the Northern Ireland economy could see a potential long term reduction 
in GVA of approximately 9%. Differences are partly driven by the fact that this report 
analyses the economic impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland using a single region model that 
considers the regional economy in isolation and only focuses on the impact of changes in 
trade.  
 ■ Results demonstrate the impact on the Northern Ireland economy of direct trade impacts 
only, and do not capture the economic consequences of Brexit on the UK economy as a 
whole. Therefore the potential knock-on effects of reduced economic activity in GB for the 
Northern Ireland economy are not captured. To provide a flavour of such effects we test the 
sensitivity of our results under the hard Brexit scenario to a potential 5% and 10% reduction 
in sales to GB1. This results in an overall reduction in GDP for a hard Brexit scenario of 4.0% 
and 4.6% respectively.
 ■ Perhaps the more interesting finding – and what this analysis is designed to shed light upon 
– is the differences in the potential sectoral impacts of the various scenarios.  
 ■ The most affected industries across all the scenarios are the food and drink and agricultural 
sectors. There are also significant impacts for the manufacturing, financial services and 
wholesale and retail sectors. The impact on food and drink is significantly larger under 
the hard Brexit scenario due to the presence of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. In the 
backstop scenarios, wholesale and retail is affected due to the presence of frictions in 
trade between GB and NI. The scenario where the backstop endures in part to NI and GB 
separately signs free trade agreement represents the most negative scenario after a hard 
Brexit.
1 Whilst this is not equivalent to a full inter-regional analysis, it does provide a useful illustration of the impact of a wider ‘domestic’ 
shock on the NI economy.
1The Direct Long-term Trade Impacts of EU Exit Scenarios on Northern Ireland, August 2019
Introduction
Section 1
2 Much of this work draws on the Scottish Government’s Computable General Equilibrium model which is based upon an original 
specification developed by the Fraser of Allander Institute.
The Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) was commissioned by the Department for the Economy (DfE) of 
the NI Civil Service to model the possible long-term economic impacts of a range of Brexit scenarios 
for Northern Ireland (NI).  
Since the 2016 EU Referendum, there has been an explosion of studies looking at the impact of 
Brexit (see for instance Ciuriak et al., 2017, Ebell and Warren, 2016, Hantzsche et al. 2018, HM 
Treasury 2016, HMG 2018, Roy et al., 2016).1 In the main, these studies have tended to focus upon 
the possible impacts of Brexit for the UK economy as a whole. The regional studies that do exist have 
typically apportioned national results to sub-regions of the UK based upon employment and sector 
shares. The main exception to this has been the work of the Scottish Government and the FAI (see 
for instance The Scottish Government, 2019 and Roy et al., 2016)2.
This study focusses on the impact of Brexit and potential future trade relationship with the EU on NI 
in isolation. It assesses the impacts on NI of dislocations to its trade with the EU and/or GB in the 
event of different Brexit scenarios. 
This has two key implications. Firstly, potential spillover from the rest of the UK (and from the rest of 
the World) to NI are not taken into account.  If Brexit leads to a slowdown in the rest of the UK, this 
will have its own knock-on effects on the NI economy. To provide a flavour of such effects we test 
the sensitivity of our results to a potential 5% and 10% reduction in sales to GB (see section 5.1.2). 
Secondly, since the primary focus of this study is the impact of Brexit on trade, we do not look at other 
sources of economic impact such as changes in migration regulations, exchange rates, impacts on 
labour productivity, foreign direct investment, business confidence or uncertainty.  
Crucially, the economic impact of the various scenarios is estimated by comparing the economy 
before and after the economic shock with everything else (including all policy decisions) being held 
constant. That is, we do not, for example, model the potential impact of future trade deals that the 
UK may sign with other ‘3rd countries’ or assess the potential loss of existing partnerships with 
countries which have currently signed trade deals with the EU. 
The analysis therefore, should not be considered a forecast and simply represents a simulation 
based on a very specific set of assumptions relating to various Brexit scenarios. 
The reminder of the report is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a simple description of the 
macroeconomic model used for this analysis. Section 3 summarises the key channels through which 
Brexit may have an impact on the Northern Ireland economy. Section 4 sets out a range of scenarios 
concerning the trading relationships that could hold when the exit from the EU is completed. Sections 
5 presents the key results. Section 6 concludes.
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Modelling framework
Section 2
3 See www.parliament.scot/General%20Documents/Fraser_of_Allander_-_Brexit.pdf
4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760484/28_November_EU_
Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf
To undertake this analysis, we make use of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework called 
NI-CGE. This is a type of simulation model widely used by governments and organisations across the 
world such as HMRC, the Scottish Government and the World Trade Organisation to look at a variety 
of policy issues including the impact of changes in trade agreements. A similar modelling approach 
was undertaken to assess the potential impacts on the Scottish economy for the cross-party Scottish 
Parliament Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Affairs Committee3.  
The NI-CGE model provides detailed representation of the Northern Ireland economy and captures 
the interlinkages between the private sector, government and households. 
The model combines economic data provided by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 
(NISRA) with a complex system of equations to give an accurate representation of the structure of 
the economy. Economic relationships in the model are based on theory and empirical evidence. This 
provides a framework to model the impact of policy changes on key economic variables.
NI-CGE is a multi-sectoral, dynamic CGE model with an imperfectly competitive labour market. It can 
simulate changes to Northern Ireland policy and capture how this will impact NI, the rest of the UK 
and the rest of the World including the EU. As it is a single region model, it cannot however assess 
the potential impacts on the NI economy from policy changes in the rest of the UK.  The model 
generates estimates of the impact of any economic shocks on aggregate and sectoral level of gross 
output, GDP, employment, unemployment, capital stock and real wages. 
The technical details of the model are set out in Lecca et al. (2013, 2014). 
Whilst this modelling framework is similar to that used as part of the HMG analysis4, it is more limited 
in its scope as it does not seek to capture second order effects arising from lower economic growth 
within the UK, EU and rest of the world, as well as potential changes to migration and fiscal policy 
resulting from Brexit. Nevertheless, it does provide a robust framework from which to assess the 
direct consequence of changes to trade policy with the EU arising from Brexit.
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Assessing the impact of Brexit on the 
Northern Ireland economy
Section 3
5 https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/eu-exit-and-impacts-northern-irelands-services-trade
To date, there is still uncertainty regarding the future trade relations between Northern Ireland and 
the EU. However, there is agreement that the economic impact of changes in trade for goods will 
mostly come through two main channels: tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers. 
Tariff barriers are set internationally to restrict the flow of goods. If there is no trade deal between the 
UK and the EU, trade between the EU and Northern Ireland will be subject to Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariffs, which implies that the same tariff is applied to all the trading partners. 
Non-tariff barriers (NTB) include the more indirect rules and regulations that can create barriers on 
trade. Non-Tariff barriers are typically driven by custom costs, rules of origin, differences in regulatory 
requirements to enter a market, restricted movement of people and other regulations. 
The combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers depends on the specific nature of the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. While tariffs are likely to feature more prominently in the 
case of no-deal, non-tariff barriers will result from any Brexit agreement in different magnitudes. For 
this reason, we explore a range of possibilities.
In addition, a study completed by the Department for the Economy5 has been used to inform analysis 
relating to the potential impact of Brexit on the services sector. This study found that the Northern 
Ireland services sector  would be affected in all Brexit scenarios and the ad valorem equivalent 
figures derived within that study have been used as a modelling input for this report.
It needs to be noted that Brexit is a national policy and therefore, in addition to direct impacts, it 
will have impacts on the rest of the UK which will spillover to NI. However, as the model is a single 
region model, these, as well as other EU and potential global impacts resulting from Brexit, will not 
be captured. To illustrate the spillover impact from GB to NI, we test the sensitivity of our results to a 
potential 5% and 10% reduction in sales to GB.
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Scenarios
Section 4
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/temporary-tariff-regime-for-no-deal-brexit-published
7 It is recognized that the UK tariff schedule is temporary. However it has been assumed that this applies into the long term for the 
purposes of this analysis.
Given that an agreement between the EU and the UK on future trade relationship has not been 
reached, a range of possible scenarios are explored. In undertaking such modelling, we have had to 
make a number of assumptions on what the various scenarios comprise. This stems, in part, from the 
lack of clarity over the detail of each option so far and the necessity of providing a transparent high-
level overview of often complex legal agreements for the purposes of a computational modelling 
framework. 
We explore three high level scenarios. For illustrative purposes we term them: hard Brexit, indefinite 
backstop, NI Backstop GB FTA/EEA and soft Brexit.
Table 1: Brexit Scenarios
Hard Brexit
All of UK including NI would trade with EU on WTO Terms using EUs MFN tariff schedule.
We also include a sensitivity whereby NI imports would be subject to the UK’s recently 
published “no deal” tariff schedule6.
Indefinite Backstop Only NI follows single market rules, however both NI and GB share same customs territory.
NI (Backstop), GB 
(EEA) Assumes no technological or facilitative solution to the border and that the backstop endures 
indefinitely (in part) to NI, with the GB future partnership with EU based on an EEA agreement 
e.g. Norway or FTA e.g. CETANI (Backstop), GB (FTA)
UK (incl. NI) in EEA 
Agreement
This option would be equivalent to having a soft Brexit with customs checks taking place on 
the NI/ROI border
Source: NI Department for Economy
I. Hard Brexit (WTO)
We take this as the default Brexit scenario and would apply if other deals cannot be secured.
In this scenario, NI (and the rest of the UK) trades with the EU under WTO rules, including tariffs. 
This scenario uses the EU’s published MFN tariff schedule as the basis for future trade, however a 
variation is included to take account of the UK Government’s recently published tariff schedule7. 
Note that this does not include the zero tariff policy across the ROI/NI border which is thought to be 
temporary and therefore inappropriate for a long-term analysis.  In summary, this scenario implies 
that trade between Northern Ireland and the EU will be characterised by:
 ■ The presence of MFN tariffs;
 ■  No obligation to apply EU laws, although traded goods would still have to meet EU 
standards;
 ■  Restriction in trade of services with the EU.
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Tariff revenues typically accrue to the central government. However, it could be argued that the 
revenue from tariffs imposed on EU imports will be redistributed at a regional level. To reflect this 
we assume that a) NI receives a share of tariff revenues equivalent to that generated by the NI trade 
flows, b) this is spent by the NI devolved government and is additional to the pre-Brexit spending 
level8. The amount is added to the pre-Brexit NI government spend and distributed across sectors 
according to the baseline proportions. 
II. Backstop
The second scenario is the so-called ‘backstop’ in place for NI. Within the backstop we also explore 
scenarios where there is no solution found to the issue of the land border on the island of Ireland 
and NI and GB have different future trading agreements with the EU. Specifically, we analyse the 
case where NI follows EU rules (customs & single market) while GB is either part of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) or has a Canada style Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU. 
The three different sub-scenarios are summarised below:
1. Indefinite backstop:
 ■ NI follows single market rules ;
 ■ NI and GB & EU share a common customs market for goods;
 ■  Trade frictions between GB-NI due to differences in regulations;
 ■  Restriction in trade of services with the EU.
2. NI  Backstop, GB EEA;
 ■  NI follows single market rules;
 ■  GB is part of the European Economic Area (EEA);
 ■  Customs checks apply in goods trade between GB and NI;
 ■  Restriction in trade services with the EU.
3. NI Backstop, GB FTA;
 ■  NI follows single market rules;
 ■  GB follows a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU;
 ■  More restrictive trade frictions between GB-NI (customs and single market);
 ■  Restriction in trade services with the EU.
8 Local government expenditure is fixed by default in all simulations. This is to reflect the fact that public expenditure is set at the 
central government level which is exogenous in this model. This assumption can be varied to reflect situations where the regional 
government has devolved fiscal powers such as in the case of Scotland.
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III. Soft Brexit (EEA)
Finally we model a scenario where the entire UK retains a close trading relationship with the EU. We 
call this a ‘soft Brexit’. This scenario is summarised as follows:
 ■  NI and GB are part of the EEA;
 ■  Rules of origin apply;
 ■ Trade of services is marginally impacted due to differences in regulations.
Each of these scenarios imply a different degree of integration with the EU. In addition, the backstop 
scenarios reflect situations where the degree of integration between NI and the EU, and GB and the 
EU varies. In this case, potential friction arises in trade between NI and GB.
Non-Tariff Barriers 
We combine information from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) on trade 
between NI and the EU with non-tariff barrier estimates between the UK & EU from HMG (2018)9.  A 
summary of non-tariff barriers applied in the study is provided in Table 2. Impacts on trade services 
are based on Services Trade Restrictiveness Indexes (STRI) specifically calculated for NI10.
Table 2: Non-tariff barriers applied in each scenario
NI- EU GB-NI
Hard Brexit 10% 0%
Indefinite backstop 0% 3%
NI (Backstop), GB (EEA) 0% 5%
NI (Backstop), GB (FTA) 0% 8%
Soft Brexit  (EEA) 5% 0%
Source: DfE Analysis
For the backstop scenarios, it is assumed that Northern Ireland essentially remains within the EU 
for goods trade i.e. both customs & single market. Consequently it is assumed that the HMG’s 
analysis relating to potential NTBs between the UK and the EU would apply for trade between GB and 
Northern Ireland as represented by the above NTB estimates. The NTB of 3% relating to the indefinite 
backstop i.e. both NI and GB share the same customs territory, represents the additional cost for 
NI businesses of checks relating to the single market. Furthermore, it is assumed that there are no 
trade restrictions for NI companies selling into GB, as per current UK government policy.
9 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760484/28_November_EU_
Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf
10 https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/eu-exit-and-impacts-northern-irelands-services-trade
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Results
Section 5
The main results from the analysis can be summarised In Table 3 below.
Table 3: Main Results
GDP Exports Real Wage Employment Investment
Hard Brexit (UK Import Tariffs) -3.0% -9.7% -3.6% -1.6% -3.8%
Hard Brexit (MFN Tariffs) -3.3% -11.7% -3.7% -1.7% -3.7%
Indefinite backstop -1.6% - 5.0% -2.3% -1.0% -1.9%
NI (Backstop), GB (EEA) -1.3% -4.0% -1.8% -0.7% -1.6%
NI (Backstop), GB (FTA) -2.7% -8.2% -3.6% -1.6% -3.4%
Soft Brexit  (EEA) -1.1% -3.4% -1.5% -0.6% -1.3%
Source: FAI Analysis
I. Hard Brexit 
Table 4 summarises the long-term impact (after 15 years) of a hard Brexit on Northern Ireland trade 
on key macroeconomic indicators expressed as a percentage change from baseline values, i.e. from 
what they would have been in the absence of Brexit. Impacts appear smaller than other previous 
studies. This reflects the intention of the report to isolate the impact of Brexit scenarios on NI own 
trade only with the EU and GB as well as using more detailed trade data.
Table 4: Hard Brexit scenario: long term % changes relative to baseline
% change
GDP -3.3
Exports -11.7
Real wage -3.7
Employment -1.7
Investment -4.2
Source: FAI Analysis
In summary, after around 15 years:
 ■ Northern Ireland GDP is expected to be around 3.3% lower than it would be otherwise;
 ■ Exports are expected to be 11.8% lower on aggregate;
 ■ Real wages are expected to be 3.7% lower , combined with employment being 1.7% lower; 
 ■ Investment is expected to be 4.2% lower than the baseline position. 
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Chart 1 reports the long-term impact on value added as a percentage change from baseline values 
for various sectors. However, it is useful to look at changes in absolute terms expressed in millions 
of pounds. For this reason, absolute changes for relevant sectors are reported in the text11.  The 
results are driven by a complex combination of factors, including EU-export and import intensity, 
size of the activity, and size of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
Chart 1: Hard Brexit. Value added: long term value change relative to baseline 
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
%
 C
ha
ng
e
Source: FAI Analysis
In summary:
 ■ Sectors with a higher exposure to EU trade experience the greatest contraction from the 
baseline position. The negative impact comes both from the direct reduction in export 
demand and from the increase in cost of imported intermediate inputs used by industries in 
production;
 ■ The most affected sector is food and drink  - GVA is expected to be 14.0% lower than it would 
be in the absence of Brexit which corresponds to a reduction of approximately £225m;
 ■ Agriculture forestry and fishing is the second most affected industry proportionately to its 
baseline value (-12.0%) and the fifth in absolute terms (-£85m);
11 Changes in absolute values are calculated using 2017 data provided by NISRA.
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 ■ Wholesale and retail and financial services are relatively large sectors in the Northern 
Ireland economy. For this reason, although the proportionate reduction in GVA is moderately 
smaller than that in other sectors, in absolute terms GVA is expected to be  £225m and 
£211m lower respectively;
 ■ Mechanical and other manufacturing industry is one of the most exposed to trade and  it 
would be  £130m lower in GVA;
 ■ Public administration, Education and Health experiences a GVA boost of 1.2% (£111m). The 
underlying assumption is that a share of tariff revenues is allocated to NI and spent primarily 
on this sector. This spending is additional to the pre Brexit government expenditure level. 
Without this boost to the economy, it is expected that the overall impact of a hard Brexit on 
GDP would be -3.8%.
It is important to stress that a key underlying assumption in this scenario is that government 
expenditure in NI is fixed to pre-Brexit levels and that tariff revenues are used to increase government 
expenditure. Essentially, this implies that post Brexit public spending is higher than the pre Brexit 
level. Of course, given that Brexit is a UK wide policy, public expenditure is subject to fluctuations in 
tax revenues at national level. Future UK governments may of course choose to change government 
spending (up or down). Of course, should a slowdown follow as a result of Brexit, the UK Government 
may be forced to make fiscal savings in the long-run. 
I (i) Hard Brexit: UK temporary tariff regime for no deal Brexit 
In March 2019 the UK Government announced the introduction of a temporary tariff regime for a no-
deal Brexit to minimise costs to business and consumers12. We use this as a scenario to the default 
hard Brexit by repeating the simulations as in the previous section but applying the tariffs outlined 
by the UK Government13 rather than the EU’s WTO MNF tariffs. 
As expected, this partly mitigates the negative impact of hard Brexit by reducing the increased costs 
for industries and consumers. However, GDP is expected to be 3.0% lower than it would otherwise 
be. This is only 0.3 percentage points higher than the default hard Brexit scenario, mainly for two 
reasons. First, although most import tariffs have been reduced, trade is still limited by non- tariff 
barriers. Second, the tariff revenue allocated to Northern Ireland reduces substantially as the UK 
operates a more liberalised trade policy for UK imports. Consequently, GVA in the public sector 
increases by £29m. 
I (ii) Hard Brexit: Sensitivity Analysis
As the objective of this report is to isolate the impact of Brexit on NI, potential spillover effects from 
the rest of the UK are not captured. As explained in the introduction, Brexit could lead to slower 
growth in the UK economy in the long run – see for example, UK Government (2018)14. This could 
impact NI through a number of channels including inter-regional trade, inter-regional migration, 
wages and regulations. 
Since the focus of this report is trade, we provide a flavour of the impact of reduced NI-GB trade 
simulating an illustrative 5% and 10% reduction in sales to GB. These are additional to the hard 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/temporary-tariff-regime-for-no-deal-brexit-published
13 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785939/Tariff_
Reference_Document_13_March_2019.pdf
14 See www.gov.uk/government/publications/exiting-the-european-union-publications
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Brexit trade shocks in section 5.1. Such simulation would reflect the fact that a smaller UK economy 
will reduce the overall demand for goods and services, including those produced in NI.
Results from simulations show that with a 5% and 10% reduction in sales to GB, NI GVA would be 
4.0% and 4.6% lower respectively. The sectoral distribution of results would be similar to that in 
Chart 1. However, in the 10% case, food and drink GVA could be up to 17.6% lower than it would be 
in the absence of Brexit.
II. Backstop
The baseline simulation for the backstop is the permanent backstop where essentially NI follows EU 
trade rules and remains within the same customs territory as GB and the EU.
II (i) Indefinite backstop
Table 5 summarises the long-term impacts (after 15 years) of ‘indefinite backstop’ on key 
macroeconomic indicators expressed as percentage change from baseline values. 
Table 5: Indefinite backstop scenario: long term % changes relative to baseline
% change
GDP -1.6
Exports -5.0
Real wage -2.3
Employment -1.0
Investment -1.9
Source: FAI Analysis
In summary:
 ■  Northern Ireland GVA is  1.6% lower than what it would have been otherwise;
 ■  Exports are 5.0% lower;
 ■  Real wage is expected to be 2.3% lower  while employment is 1.0% lower;
 ■  Investment is expected to be 1.9% lower than the baseline position.
The impacts are generally smaller than in the hard Brexit scenario. In addition, the results are driven 
by different forces. No tariffs are imposed in this scenario and goods are free to circulate between NI 
and the EU. However, there are some frictions between NI and the rest of the UK, and restrictions are 
applied to services trade with the EU. 
These differences are reflected in the long-term impact on value added reported in Chart 2. 
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Chart 2: Indefinite Backstop.  Value added: long term value change relative to baseline
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Source: FAI Analysis
In summary:
 ■ The impacts are greater on those sectors who trade services or have the greatest exposure 
to trade with GB;
 ■ The most affected sector in proportionate terms is information and communication services 
(-3.3%);
 ■ The most affected sector in absolute terms is financial services, where value added is 
expected to be £117m lower;
 ■ This is followed by mechanical and other manufacturing sectors (-£90m), constructions and 
wholesale and retail (-£65m and -£63m);
 ■ Value added on other services increases by £2m. This is because it is a small industry with 
very little exposure to trade and it benefits from the reduced labour cost as there is less 
demand for labour associated with the lower level of economic output.
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II (i) NI backstop, GB EEA (BEEA) and NI Backstop GB FTA (BFTA)
The impact of these two scenarios are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Backstop/EEA, Backstop/FTA scenarios: long term % changes relative to baseline
BEEA BFTA
% change % change
GDP -1.3 -2.7
Exports -4.0 -8.2
Real wage -1.8 -3.6
Employment -0.7 -1.6
Investment -1.6 -3.4
Source: FAI Analysis
In summary:
 ■ Impacts are positively related to the level of integration between the GB and EU markets;
 ■ Export are expected to fall more in the FTA case due to higher restrictions in trade services 
and the higher costs of GB imports;
 ■ The reduction in GB to NI trade is higher in the FTA case and this exacerbates the impacts on 
the macroeconomy. 
Chart 3 illustrates value changes in GVA in the case of indefinite backstop, backstop/EEA and 
backstop FTA.
13The Direct Long-term Trade Impacts of EU Exit Scenarios on Northern Ireland, August 2019
Chart 3: Comparing backstop scenarios. Value added: long term percentage change relative to baseline 
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In summary:
 ■ Backstop/EEA has a smaller negative impact on services industries, especially on financial 
services; 
 ■ Impacts of backstop/FTA are typically greater than under the other scenarios; 
 ■ In proportionate terms, agriculture and food and drink sectors are the most impacted 
sectors.
 ■ The most impacted sectors in absolute terms are financial services (-£229m), mechanical 
manufacturing and other manufacturing (-£141m) and wholesale and retail (-£108m). 
 ■ Under backstop/FTA financial services experience the greatest contraction in absolute GVA 
terms (£229m).
As Chart 3 illustrates most sectors are negatively affected under each potential backstop scenario. 
However Chart 4 below demonstrates that some sectors are worse off under the backstop than 
compared to a hard Brexit. The bars in Chart 4 represent the difference in percentage points between 
the percentage change in value added under Backstop –GB FTA, and Backstop –GB EEA and Hard 
Brexit with reduced UK import tariffs. 
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Chart 4: Comparing sectoral impacts under the backstop compared to a Hard Brexit with UK import tariffs.
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Source: FAI Analysis
Although both the agriculture and food and drink sectors will be significantly better off under the 
main backstop scenarios compared to a hard Brexit, this is not the case for all sectors with e.g. 
electrical manufacturing being up to 3% worse off under the backstop. This is due in part to the 
fact that a significant proportion of intermediate inputs for this sector are sourced from GB and will 
be adversely affected if trade frictions arise from either e.g. customs declarations or single market 
checks.
III. Soft Brexit
In this scenario both NI and GB are part of the European Economic Area. Impacts on key macroeconomic 
variables are summarised in Table 7.
Table 7: EEA scenario: long term % changes relative to baseline
% change
GDP -1.1
Exports -3.4
Real wage -1.5
Employment -0.6
Investment -1.3
Source: FAI Analysis
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In summary:
 ■ Impact on GDP is approximately 1/3 of the reduction under the WTO scenario;
 ■ Impacts on exports, wages employment and investment are still negative but smaller than 
any other scenario.
The sectoral distribution of impact is represented in Chart 5. 
Chart 5: Soft Brexit. Value added: long term value change relative to baseline (2013)
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In summary:
 ■ Sectoral impacts are generally smaller than in the other scenarios;
 ■ In proportionate terms, agriculture and food and drinks are the most affected sectors 
(-3.4%), with food and drink being also the second most affected in absolute terms (-£55m);
 ■ The most affected industry in absolute terms is wholesale and retail, with GVA  being -£77m 
lower compared to the baseline;
 ■ Financial services is the third most affected in absolute terms industries (-£57m), followed 
by mechanical and other manufacturing (-47m).
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Conclusions
Section 6
In this report we explore the possible impact of Brexit on the NI economy. While a number of studies 
have analysed the impact of Brexit for the UK as a whole, or apportioned UK results to Northern 
Ireland, this is the first attempt to isolate the impact of potential Brexit scenario on NI’s own trade 
with the EU and GB.
 We employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of NI developed by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute. Since an agreement between the EU and the UK has not been signed, we explore a range 
of scenarios, representing different degrees of integration between NI and EU markets and between 
NI and GB markets. 
Whilst the scenarios we have modelled are illustrative, they provide a useful indication of both the 
scale of any Brexit impacts, and crucially the channels through which any effects will be transferred.
We find that Brexit has negative impacts on the NI economy in all the scenarios. However, the scale 
of the impacts is relatively smaller when compared to previous UK studies (HMT 2016, HMG 2018). 
This is because the use of a single region model has meant we are limited to modelling  the direct 
impact of Brexit on NI’s trade and indirect impacts/spillovers (for example the impact on NI sales to 
GB as a result of Brexit impacting the rest of the UK have not been captured). In addition, it reflects 
specific characteristics of the Northern Ireland economy such as its exposure to trade with the EU 
and its relatively large public sector. The magnitude of the impact varies depending on the specific 
post Brexit trading agreement and on the impact of these on trade intensive sectors. 
In the hard Brexit scenario, both EU MFN tariffs and non-tariff barriers are applied to trade with the 
EU. This would deliver a potential 3.3% reduction in GDP after 15 years compared to the baseline 
position. The most affected sectors are food and drink, manufacturing and agriculture. 
The negative impact of hard Brexit could be partly mitigated if tariffs are reduced as announced by 
the UK Government. In this case, GDP would be 3.0% lower that it would otherwise be. 
However, if Brexit causes a general slowdown of the UK economy (as predicted by most studies at 
the UK level), and this causes a reduction in GB consumption of NI produced goods, the fall in GDP 
could be significantly higher. For instance, if under hard Brexit NI sales to GB falls by 5% or 10%, GDP 
would fall by 4.0% and 4.6% respectively.  
In the case of a backstop, a crucial point is the presence of non-tariff barriers between NI and GB and 
the openness to trade services (services trade are not covered by the provisions of the backstop). 
In the case where NI is in the backstop but GB and NI share a common trade area and frictions arise 
only by the existence of different regulations, GDP is expected to be 1.6% lower than the baseline. 
When GB is part of EEA or of a FTA, GDP is expected to be 1.3% and 2.7% lower respectively.  This 
is because whilst NI would be free to trade goods with the EU, it would see a substantial reduction 
in trade with GB, which is the region’s main trade partner. The distribution of the impacts across 
sectors is quite different from the hard Brexit Scenario, in that in the backstop case most of the 
negative impact would come from reduced trade of most manufactured goods and services, but less 
from food and drinks. 
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In the case of a soft Brexit, GDP is expected to be 1.1% lower than the baseline value. Sector specific 
impacts are on average smaller than in the other scenarios and food and drink, manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail are again the most impacted sectors.
Because our model is a single region model, this analysis only captures the impact of Brexit on NI 
in isolation.  However, Brexit will affect the UK as a whole and negative impact on the rest of the UK 
are likely to exacerbate the impact on the region as pointed out in Roy et al. (2016) and Figus et al. 
(2017) in their analysis for Scotland.
A natural extension to this study is to use a NI-GB interregional model to look at the impact of Brexit 
on the UK as a whole and capture feedback effects between the two regions. This would also offer a 
more accurate framework to look at potential asymmetries between post-Brexit arrangements in NI 
and in the rest of the UK. 
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